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ABSTRACT
This paper presents public–private partnership (PPP) framework models for funding and financing of water services 
infrastructure at local government (municipalities) level (sphere) in South Africa. Data were assembled from various 
stakeholders, viz., private and public sector institutions in the Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa. The 
framework for PPPs identified three models, viz. state, hybrid and private sector models. In the ‘state model’ the water 
services value chain is 100% government funded and owned infrastructure. Government i s  a key player in infrastructure 
investment and inefficiencies within the public expenditure management systems are particularly detrimental, e.g., there 
are significant problems in spending of infrastructure budgets. In the ‘private model’ harnessing the significant potential for 
capital markets to finance water infrastructure, particularly local bond markets, is contingent on their strengthening and 
further development. Well-functioning and appropriately institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) 
would be natural sources of long-term financing for water services infrastructure because liabilities would better match the 
longer terms of water infrastructure projects. The ‘hybrid model’ is in the middle of the water services value chain, i.e., a 
partnership between government and the private sector. The use of this framework is essential in the including of the private 
sector in the implementation of water infrastructure development projects. The research results highlight the underlying 
principles that underpin, support, determine and confirm the success of the PPP models and value chain framework for 
local government water infrastructure in South Africa. Twelve key parameters were identified that would drive the success 
of any water services infrastructure PPP model. Even though PPP is an alternative procurement vehicle, PPP models are 
considered to be used as vehicles for addressing institutional challenges in local government. However, in most cases it has 
been indicated that lack of technical and financial skills and monitoring of the private operator are serious challenges.
Keywords: financing, funding, Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces, PPP framework, PPP models, water services 
infrastructure
INTRODUCTION
Many developing countries need water infrastructure to 
improve the livelihoods of their citizens and their quality of 
life, and South Africa is no exception. While there are many 
constraints to the delivery of water services infrastructure, one 
of the most obvious factors that hampers delivery is project 
costs. Access to finance is the lifeblood of water services infra-
structure delivery, as is the packaging of the funding model 
for each project or groups of projects. Unfortunately, the cost 
of water services infrastructure delivery continues to escalate 
to the point where many developing countries simply cannot 
afford such infrastructure.
The backlog of water infrastructure provision and poor 
access to service delivery for poor communities have forced a 
new approach for governments, industries, financiers and other 
role players. Delays escalate the eventual cost of infrastruc-
ture even more. Countries like South Africa have no choice 
but to look at innovative approaches, such as public–private 
partnerships (PPP) models, to ensure that they eliminate their 
water infrastructure backlogs. Efficient and productive water 
services infrastructure are important inputs for all industries 
and hence vital for economic growth and efficiency, productiv-
ity and competitiveness. Continued growth in infrastructure 
productivity will play a crucial role in managing the emerging 
challenge of South Africa’s growing population (DBSA, 2009; 
DWAF, 2004, 2008). 
The Department of Water Affairs (DWA, now the 
Department of Water and Sanitation) traditionally funded 
water infrastructure development projects in South Africa 
(DWAF, 2003, 2004, 2008; DBSA, 2009; Moseki et al., 2011; 
Ruiters, 2011). With the growing demands on water infrastruc-
ture, no appropriate and alternative analyses and models have 
since been proposed and finalised. There is therefore pressure 
to consider alternative funding models for improved water 
services infrastructure management, particularly by investigat-
ing relevant PPP funding models (World Bank, 1994; Matta and 
Ashkenas, 2003; ADB, 2008; Ruiters, 2011, 2013; Matji, 2013; 
Matji and Ruiters, 2015a, b). 
Municipalities (with water services authority status) are 
facing various challenges such as the lack of technical, planning 
and management skills, limited financial resources, and lack of 
operation and maintenance resulting in dilapidating and aging 
water and sanitation services infrastructure. There has been 
rapid decentralisation of the responsibility for the provision of 
water services (water and sanitation), with massive spending and 
development to achieve universal access, which has occurred 
in tandem with massive changes (transformation) in the form 
and function of local government (DPLG, 2000a, 2000b; DWAF, 
1997a, 1997b, 2003; NT, 2003, 2013c; DCoG, 2010; Eales, 2011). 
The role of local government has been fundamentally recon-
ceived and reconfigured as the primary driver and enabler of 
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development, i.e., water services (DPLG, 2000a, 2000b; DWAF, 
1997a, 1997b, 2003; NT, 2003, 2013c; DCoG, 2010; Eales, 2011). 
Municipalities (with water services authority status) have to find 
creative and innovative models that can assist in responding to 
water services infrastructure delivery needs. In South Africa, a 
few municipalities contracted private sector operators during the 
1990s under lease or concession contracts (Marin et al., 2009). 
The primary objectives of this research were: (i) to develop a 
public–private partnership (PPP) conceptual framework; (ii) the 
identification and review of PPP models for funding and financ-
ing of water services infrastructure at local government (munici-
palities) level (sphere) in South Africa; and (iii) to determine key 
principles and parameters (variables) that should inform the 
development of a cost-effective PPP model to ensure sustainabil-
ity of local government water infrastructure.
METHODS
Data collection
The primary and secondary data collection methods for the 
research involved the following (Coldwell and Herbst, 2004; 
Tustin et al., 2005):
Primary data
Data were collected from a sample of 24 participating water 
sector organisations using a Likert scale questionnaire and 
the purposive sampling method. Homogeneous sampling as a 
purposive sampling technique was used to achieve a homoge-
neous sample; that is, a sample whose units (e.g., people, cases, 
etc.) share the same (or very similar) characteristics or traits 
(e.g. group(s) of people that are similar in terms of background, 
occupation, etc.). Participants were chosen to represent a homo-
geneous sample since the research questions were specific to the 
characteristics of the particular group of interest. Participants 
included officials and politicians from municipalities in the 
study area (Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa), 
Rand Water, Umgeni Water, Magalies Water, Johannesburg 
Water, East Rand Water Care Company (ERWAT), local and 
international private companies with an interest in water and 
sanitation infrastructure within and outside the study area, 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa, officials from the 
national Department of Water Affairs (now the Department of 
Water and Sanitation), National Treasury and water user asso-
ciations operating in the study area. The sample represented 
individuals with special technical and financial expertise and 
knowledge of water infrastructure finance, planning, develop-
ment, policy and regulation.
The primary data were collected from the Gauteng and 
Limpopo Provinces by questionnaire (Appendix 1). These two 
provinces were selected for primary data collection since most 
of the PPP contracts/agreements were concluded and are oper-
ating in a number of municipalities (water services authorities) 
within them. Data were assembled in the period May–August 
2013. Methods that were used to assemble the data included:
•	 E-mail correspondence with participants. Some participants 
compiled a comprehensive write-up of their views by e-mail. 
This was over and above questions raised in the questionnaire.
•	 One-on-one interviews with participants. Meetings were 
arranged to present completed questionnaires and provided 
an opportunity to ask more questions and assemble addi-
tional data.
•	 Group discussions on and debates on public–private part-
nerships (PPP). This implies that responses presented were 
a consolidation of different views, ideas, perceptions and 
understanding of public–private partnerships.
Secondary data
Reviewed reports relating to water services infrastructure needs 
and funding in the Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces, and addi-
tional research information on water services PPP funding mod-
els were obtained from case studies in other provinces (DCoG, 
2010; DWA, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2013; NT, 2011a, 
2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2013a, b, c, d). Data obtained from physical 
documentation were also provided by some of the participants. 
Statistical analysis
For the quantitative data analysis, (i) nominal (categorical); and 
(ii) ordinal (ranked) data (scales) types were considered and 
used, where appropriate (cf. Taylor, 2002; Coldwell and Herbst, 
2004; Tustin et al., 2005). The non-parametric chi-square (χ2) 
test statistic was used to determine whether dependency (or 
contingency) exists between the PPP models key financial 
variables (i.e. awareness, success, appropriateness, (economic) 
viability and attractiveness) and evaluation criteria (i.e. 
strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree and strongly disagree) 
identified from the primary data collection (cf. Coldwell and 
Herbst, 2004; Tustin et al., 2005). The arcsine √x was used for 
the data transformation before application, where appropriate 
(cf. Tustin et al. 2005). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Public–private partnership (PPP) value chain framework 
models
The results of the study identified three overarching models 
within the PPP value chain framework (Fig. 1):
•	 State model: The water services value chain is 100% gov-
ernment funded and owned infrastructure. Government is 
a key player in infrastructure investment and inefficiencies 
within the public expenditure management systems are 
particularly detrimental, e.g., there are significant problems 
in spending of infrastructure budgets (DCoG, 2010; NT, 
2011d, 2013b, c; DWA, 2012a). 
•	 Private model: The other extreme of the water services 
value chain is 100% private sector funded and owned infra-
structure. Harnessing the significant potential for capital 
markets to finance water infrastructure, particularly local 
bond markets, is contingent on their strengthening and 
further development. Well-functioning and appropriately 
institutional investors (pension funds, insurance compa-
nies, etc.) would be natural sources of long-term financing 
for water services infrastructure because liabilities would 
better match the longer terms of water infrastructure pro-
jects (cf. Inderst, 2009; World Bank, 2010; TCTA, 2012). 
•	 Hybrid model: In the middle of the water services value 
chain is a hybrid model, i.e., between government and the 
private sector. An institutional framework was developed 
to guide this type of development (NT, 2000; OECD, 2008, 
2010, 2012; DCoG, 2010). The use of this framework is 
essential in including the private sector in the implementa-
tion of water infrastructure development projects  
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politicians must take into account that PPP arrangements 
will only make sense if the contract is long-term (e.g. > 10 
years).
•	 Strong enforcement of regulations for all PPP contracts: 
There seems to be little or no support for effective regula-
tion of PPP arrangements. In local government, a shortage 
of technical and management skills makes it more difficult 
for PPP contracts to be managed or monitored.
•	 Revenue flows or ability to recover the debt quicker: The 
length of the PPP contracts should enable municipalities to 
recover debt over a shorter timeframe. This implies that the 
contract be structured in such a way that there is no penalty 
for early settlement of the debt.
Comparative assessment of PPP governance models
The conceptual PPP value chain framework model parameters 
derived from the results are presented. Some 50% of the respon-
dents were aware of the PPP models for the delivery of water 
services infrastructure in the study area, whereas about 67% 
of the respondents were aware of the existence of PPP models 
in the water sector and other sectors of the economy (Fig. 2). 
Furthermore, 12 key parameters were identified that would 
drive any water services infrastructure PPP model (Table 1). 
PPP models allow the public and private sectors to forge efficient 
partnerships and enable a robust pipeline of economic water 
services infrastructure to be built around the country without 
delay. From the results it was found that approximately 65% of 
the participants agreed that PPP contractual arrangements that 
they are aware of are yielding desired results (Fig. 3). However, it 
does not necessarily mean that there are not challenges with such 
PPPs. Some 22% of the participants who expressed a neutral view 
believed that current challenges in some of the PPPs are serious 
and could derail the PPP arrangements if they are not addressed. 
After the introduction of the National Free Basic Water Policy 
(DWAF, 2003), the culture of payment for services declined. 
Consequently, this led to the renegotiation of the concessionaire 
(NT, 2000, OECD, 2012). Meaningful involvement by the 
private sector is, however, not automatic but subjected to 
important prerequisites for such financing, i.e., political 
commitment, enabling legislation, evaluation framework, 
expertise, project prioritisation, risk management, and 
standardisation (RCCAO, 2006; Sihombing, 2008; OECD, 
2008, 2010, 2012; ADB, 2008; Rowey, 2009; Laitinen et al., 
2010; Leach, 2010; UNESCAP, 2011; KPMG, 2011; MOF, 
2012).
In addition, the research results highlight the following under-
lying principles that underpin, support and determine the 
above-mentioned overarching PPP value chain framework 
derived from the selected municipalities within the Gauteng 
and Limpopo Provinces in South Africa (cf. Table 1; NT, 2000; 
ADB, 2008; MOF, 2012; OECD, 2012):
•	 Comprehensive feasibility study: Any PPP contract should 
be informed by an in-depth analysis of the technical, finan-
cial, social and legal aspects of the project.
•	 Contract management regime: PPP contracts are managed 
as part of the project planning process.
•	 Long-term contractual arrangement compliance: A munici-
pality must adhere to due processes; however, the contract 
should be reviewed every 3 years.
•	 PPP contractual arrangements: must be carefully scruti-
nised prior to finalisation to ensure that the consumer’s 
interest is protected. PPP contracts must adhere to a social 
and commercial balance. 
•	 PPP contracts: Approvals should be centralised and man-
aged by the National Treasury to minimise potential abuse 
and promote competitive advantages.
•	 Assessments and/or due diligence: Based on the current 
trends private sector institutions approach municipalities 
to negotiate PPP contracts instead of them taking a deci-
sion on whether the infrastructure challenges should be 
addressed through PPP contracts.
•	 Timeframe of PPP arrangements: Municipal officials and 
Figure 1
Public–private partnership value chain framework and models for water services infrastructure from data collected in the Limpopo and Gauteng 
Provinces of South Africa
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of arrangement, there is no incentive for the transfer of skills, 
creativity and innovation to achieve operational efficiency.
These results and case studies from the Gauteng and 
Limpopo Provinces have confirmed that well-structured PPP 
models for water and sanitation infrastructure can be a suc-
cess, on condition that there are sufficient revenue streams 
and the contract suits all parties involved (cf. Moleke, 2000; 
ADB, 2008; Bender and Gibson, 2010; OECD, 2010; KPMG, 
2011; Matji, 2013). In general, municipalities need educa-
tion, awareness and training on the functions, benefits, 
challenges and other implications of PPP models. Lack of 
technical, management and legal capacity of municipalities 
make it difficult for PPP models to be successfully imple-
mented in local government. Even though the results have 
indicated that investors or financiers have interest in local 
government water infrastructure, lack of technical oversight 
remains a challenge. In order to gain maximum benefit from 
all PPP arrangements across the water sector or other sectors, 
approval and finalisation of PPP contracts should be cen-
tralised. The National Treasury’s Public Private Partnership 
Figure 2
Percentage awareness (arcsine √x transformed) of PPP models for water 
services infrastructure delivery at local government level in the Gauteng 
and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa
Figure 3
Percentage (arcsine √x transformed) of respondents agreeing/
disagreeing on the performance of contractual arrangements for PPP 
models at local government in the Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of 
South Africa
Figure 4
The extent to which participants agree/disagree (arcsine √x transformed) 
that PPP governance models address institutional arrangements at local 
government
to shift the risk back to municipalities (Bender and Gibson, 
2010). New elements that were incorporated as an addendum 
to the original contract were: (i) exemption from committing 
further investment of concessionaire’s own funds; (ii) receive 
operating subsidies as partial payment for unpaid bills as well 
as capital subsidies for infrastructure investment in previously 
underserved areas; and (iii) eliminating of large annual payments 
to the municipalities. In addition, there is no strong contract 
management by municipalities due to lack of technical skills. 
Importantly, these types of PPP models allow the public sector 
to provide capital that can also earn a potential return and is 
recycled (cf. Lang and Merion, 1993; AASHTO, 1995; Goodman 
and Hastak, 2006; ADB, 2008). The PPP models are typically a 
variation of the design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) model or 
the design-build-operate (DBO) model (NT, 2000; ADB, 2008; 
OECD, 2008, 2010, 2012; MOF, 2012): 
•	 Design-build-finance-operate (DBFO) model – the most 
common form of PPP, involving the integration of these 
four functions, design, build, finance and operate, within 
one PPP service provider. The PPP provider will secure its 
own financing to build, maintain and operate the facilities 
to meet the public sector’s requirements. 
•	 Design-build-operate (DBO) model – the public sector 
provides the funds for the design and building of the facil-
ity, and then continues to engage the same private vendor to 
operate the facility. The operator is then paid a management 
fee according to performance standards. This model may 
be suitable for very large projects which the private sector is 
unable to finance wholly. 
Even though PPP is an alternative procurement vehicle, about 
54% of the participants agreed that PPP models can also be used 
as vehicles to address institutional challenges in local govern-
ment (Fig. 4). In most of the case studies considered in this 
research, PPP models are managed through service level agree-
ments or memoranda of understanding between the government 
institution and a private company. However, in most cases it has 
been indicated that lack of technical skills and monitoring of 
the private operator are serious challenges (Bender and Gibson, 
2010). All municipalities in the study area engage private sec-
tor institutions through an open tender system. In such cases, 
the full project, technical, financial, legal and contractual risks 
reside with the municipality, i.e., the state model. In this type 
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TABLE 1
Comparison of PPP models in terms of 12 parameters for water services infrastructure delivery at local government in the 
Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa
No. Model parameters Parameters of the State Model Parameters of the Hybrid Model




100% of the technical and project risk 
is carried by the state.
There is shared risk between the 
state and private sector. The range is 
between 10% and 90%.
100% of the risk is carried by the 
private sector.
2 Financial risk 100% of the risk is carried by the 
state. The state funds everything.
The risk is shared by both the state 
and private sector institution. The 
range is between 10% and 90%.
100% of the risk is carried by the 
private sector. Private sector funds 
everything.
3 Contractual risk The state carries the full risk. The risk is shared by both parties. The private sector carries the full 
risk.
4 Skills and 
knowledge 
transfer
Private sector will not prefer trans-
ferring skills and knowledge to 
government officials because it might 
put them out of business.
Transfer of skills and knowledge can 
easily be enforced and there will be 
willingness from the private sector.
Private sector prefers to retain skills 
to maintain competitive advantage.
5 Roles and 
responsi-
bilities of state 
institutions
Implementation of local government 
infrastructure is the mandate of local 
authorities. Section 152 (b) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. National Departments and state 
-owned entities support local govern-
ment (section 154 (1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa). 
National government can easily be 
caught in conflicting roles of imple-
mentation, policy-making, and 
regulation.
Local government remains the 
implementer but with the support of 
private sector institutions and state-
owned entities. 
Strong and independent water sector 
regulator is required.
Private sector implements on behalf 
of local government. 
Very strong and independent water 




Heavy reliance on government 
grants. Some schemes imple-
mented with appropriate revenue 
flow and affordability assessments. 
Sustainability of infrastructure 
becomes a serious challenge.
Affordability and revenue flows are 
prioritised, because these might 
have a negative effect on business 
operations. Proper assessments are 
conducted prior to full-scale pro-
ject implementation. Private sector 
invests on the basis of government 
subsidy to either capital or revenue.
Affordability and revenue flows are 
of highest priority. Private sector 
invests on the basis of return on 
investment or return on equity.
7 Value for money There is a high chance of financing 
operational inefficiencies in the system. 
There are limited chances that consult-
ants or service providers will focus 
on value for money when supporting 
government. Operational efficiency 
and cost optimisation is of highest 
priority. The intention is to maximise 
profits and reward shareholders.
Operational efficiency and cost opti-
misation prioritised.
8 Ownership of 
infrastructure
The state owns the infrastructure. The state owns the infrastructure. The ultimate owner of the infra-
structure can be the private sector. 
This is once the debt is settled.
9 Socio-political 
concerns/issues
Section 152 (e) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa man-
dates local government to encourage 
the involvement of communities and 
community organisations in the mat-
ters of local government. 
Sometimes decisions on payments for 
services are imposed because govern-
ment will subsidise.
Effective engagement of communi-
ties is prioritised as required by law 
because of private sector involvement 
and levels of subsidy required as 
prescribed by contractual obligations 
between the parties.
Socio-political concerns are of 
highest priority because negative 
outcomes can affect the bottom-line 
of the business. If such concerns are 
not addressed, there are chances 
that the investor will not invest.
10 Funds following 
functions
Funds should follow function as 
required by the Public Finance 
Management Act/Municipal Finance 
Management Act. 
Funds for local government water 
infrastructure should go to munici-
palities directly.
Funds for either capital contribu-
tion or revenue subsidy should flow 
through the municipality.
Private sector recovers costs from 
users either directly as per agree-
ment with the municipality or the 
municipality recovers costs on 
behalf of the private sector.
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Unit should be mandated to review all local government PPP 
contracts and approve them after conducting due diligence 
(cf. NT, 1999, 2000, 2003; OECD, 2010, 2012).
There have been attempts to involve the private sector in pub-
lic–private partnerships models for the creation of water services 
and wastewater infrastructure but not with the commitment, 
consistency, or the legislative protection that would encourage 
and protect private sector investment and encourage long-term 
partnerships (Moleke, 2000; Bender and Gibson, 2010; DCoG, 
2010; Ruiters, 2011; Matji, 2013). However, there are several con-
tracts with private operators for water services and wastewater 
infrastructure provision which include the following:
•	 In the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality, the Council 
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was involved 
in a public–private partnership for biogas generation in 
wastewater treatment plants, i.e., the up-scaling of the 
technology for biogas (sludge to energy). The partners in 
this PPP model transaction are Barloworld Power, East 
Rand Water (ERWAT), CSIR, University of Pretoria and 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) as the 
project financier. Funds were sourced from the Green Fund. 
Barloworld Power will provide operation and maintenance 
of the generators for a period of 7 years, whereas the CSIR 
will continue with research and development related work 
and further support for 2 to 3 years after project comple-
tion. Operation and maintenance costs will be recovered 
from the sale of biogas produced. ERWAT owns the waste-
water treatment plant or overall infrastructure in which the 
technology will be up-scaled. 
•	 The City of Johannesburg took a strategic decision to cor-
poratize its water and sanitation services (i.e. Johannesburg 
Water) and keep these under public management over the 
long term (Marin et al., 2009). This was achieved through the 
management contract between the City of Johannesburg and 
a consortium of international operators led by Suez (Marin 
et al., 2009). This management contract was secured through 
an open tender system. The primary aim of the PPP was not 
to transfer the utility to a private operator over the long term, 
but rather to leverage the expertise of an experienced opera-
tor for a few years in order to establish a viable, corporatized 
public water utility (Marin et al., 2009). Johannesburg Water 
is a product of a successful public–private partnership model 
in water, which evolved into a public–public partnership 
(i.e. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality and 
Johannesburg Water). Even though Johannesburg Water was 
established as a municipal entity in terms of the Municipal 
Systems Act (DPLG, 2000), it is now operating as a public–
public partnership model or corporatized water utility with 
the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) responsible for revenue, billing, 
and collection from consumers and Johannesburg Water 
(JW) is responsible for operating and maintaining both water 
and sanitation infrastructure (JW, 2012). The entity is also 
responsible for capital infrastructure development, renewal 
and rehabilitation to ensure uninterrupted supply of services. 
The entity is responsible for a water distribution network of 
about 11 000 km, 11 000 km of wastewater collection network 
and over 100 reservoirs. The entity purchases 1 470 ML/day of 
water from Rand Water and also treats about 980 ML/day of 
wastewater (JW, 2012). Johannesburg Water has entered into a 
7-year PPP arrangement for the biogas project in its Northern 
Works Wastewater Treatment Works. The arrangement was 
finalised in 2012. The contractual arrangement is structured 
in such a way that Johannesburg Water purchased some of the 
biogas-fuelled generators and the contractor invested in other 
required capital infrastructure. The PPP arrangement is based 
on the design–build–operate–maintain model for a period of 
7 years. After 7 years, the contractor will hand over the infra-
structure to Johannesburg Water. The contract will recover its 
costs from the sale of biogas generated from the operations.
•	 The City of Tshwane entered into a public–private partner-
ship with Magalies Water Board, ABSA Bank and Bigen 
Africa, in the construction of a 60 ML/day water purification 
plant. ABSA Bank was the financier, Bigen Africa was the 
consulting engineer responsible for the engineering design 
and implementation oversight, Magalies Water was charged 
with the responsibility of operation and maintenance of the 
facility after completion, and the City of Tshwane was the 
beneficiary (Matji, 2013). The total value of the project was 
R500 million. The PPP model was used as a vehicle for ring-
fencing bulk water and sanitation services. The contract was 
for a period of 20 years. Its success was based on sustainable 
revenue flows to the City of Tshwane.
•	 In the Mogalakwena Local Municipality, located within the 
Waterberg District Municipality of the Limpopo Province, 
there has been only one public–private partnership project 
for a period of 30 years (Matji, 2013). The PPP arrange-
ment is for the Doorndraai pipeline from Doorndraai Dam 
to Mokopane town. The entire capital cost was borne by 
TABLE 1 (continued)
No. Model parameters Parameters of the State Model Parameters of the Hybrid Model
Parameters of the Private 
Sector Model
11 Technology and 
innovation
There is a limited chance that the 
state will benefit from technology 
and creative solutions. 
There is a high chance of a private 
sector institution using state funds to 
develop technology that will be sold 
back to the state at a high cost.
There is shared creativity and techno-
logical innovations between the state 
and private sector. Creative solutions 
are explored to maximise profit and 
achieve operational efficiency.
Creative solutions and high levels of 
innovation are of highest priority. 
These are used as tools for achiev-
ing operational efficiency and cost 
optimisation.
12 Open and trans-
parent procure-
ment process
Private sector services are procured 
through an open tender system. 
Sometimes functionality, knowledge 
and expertise do not drive the award-
ing of the tender. 
Government carries the risk of fail-
ure alone and can always inject more 
funds to correct the situation.
Open tender system is used but the 
private sector institutions must prove 
that they have the capabilities to 
deliver desired services. Failure to 
deliver could lead to the collapse of 
the business operations.
Open tender system is used. 
Private sector capabilities and 
performance requirements are of 
highest priority, else shareholder 
needs will not be realised.
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the mines against a 30-year agreement for the sale of final 
effluent by the Mogalakwena Municipality to the mines. 
The contractual arrangement between the mines and the 
Mogalakwena Municipality is currently managed jointly by 
the Mogalakwena Local Municipality and Lepelle Northern 
Water Board. Even though the PPP arrangement in the 
Mogalakwena Local Municipality seems to be successful, 
some raised contractual challenges that could compromise 
the municipality. The shortcomings of this PPP model 
arrangement are that project life-cycle costs were not 
factored into the contractual arrangement. Factors such 
as operation and maintenance costs, finance charges, and 
depreciation of the assets were not taken into account.
•	 Other potential PPP model arrangements were: (i) the 
bulk water services pipeline project from Flag Boshielo to 
Mogalakwena town which included the Department of Water 
Affairs, Mogalakwena Local Municipality and the mines in 
the Waterberg District (NT, 2013c); and (ii) the feasibility 
stage of the Lephalale bulk and reticulation water services 
infrastructure between the Lephalale Local Municipality, 
National Treasury and a transaction advisor (NT, 2013c). 
The above-mentioned PPP models were highly successful 
within these provinces as a result of the following (Moleke, 
2000; Bender and Gibson, 2010; DWA, 2012c; Matji, 2013):
•	 Well-structured public–private partnerships models for 
water and sanitation infrastructure can be a success, on 
condition that there are sufficient revenue streams, appro-
priate contracting models and that all parameters for the 
framework of PPP models are taken into account. These 
were initiated to improve performance, encouraging private 
participation and improving governance from within. 
PPP occurred with most having been lease contracts (or 
affermage) to ensure good control of the management and 
operations of the water and sanitation systems.
•	 Access to water supply for households in the concession 
areas increased from 47% to 94% since 2010.
•	 Water and effluent quality is excellent in the systems oper-
ated by the concessionaire.
•	 Infrastructure operated by the concessionaire is in good 
order, due to a strong maintenance programme.
•	 The concessionaire has virtually spent 100% of the capital 
grant for extending and upgrading infrastructure in for-
merly under-serviced areas.
•	 The concessionaire has a very good employee training and 
development programme. This is also complemented by 
well qualified and competent staff members.
•	 Tariff levels in the concession areas are similar or lower for 
comparable municipalities.
Key financial variables for PPP models for water services 
infrastructure at local government 
The results demonstrate that the key financial (awareness, 
success, appropriateness, (economic) viability and attractive-
ness) and evaluation criteria for the PPP models are indepen-
dent and not associated, with χ2 > 16.92, α = 0.05 and ν (degrees 
of freedom) = 9. Thus, the value of the χ2 test statistic (χ2 = 
72.203, P < 0.001) exceeds the critical value of χ2, at α = 0.05 
level of significance (Figs 5–8). This is highlighted in that 
approx. 52% of the respondents agreed that PPP models take 
into account all key variables that can affect their sustainability 
(Fig. 5). Some 62% of the participants believe that PPP models 
are economically viable or financially sustainable. On the con-
trary, about 30% believe that they are not economically viable 
because of revenue streams and the highly politicised local gov-
ernment environment. About 83% of the participants agreed 
that PPP models should be used to address operation and main-
tenance challenges for water and sanitation infrastructure (Fig. 
6). Whereas some 58% of the participants strongly agreed that 
PPP models are appropriate vehicles for addressing the fund-
ing and financing of water services infrastructure operation 
and maintenance challenges at local government level (Fig. 6). 
However, the success of the PPP model(s) would depend on the 
status or condition of the infrastructure at the time of transfer 
or take-over. About 61% of the participants agreed that water 
sector PPP models are attractive to investors and financiers 
because of potential revenue streams from users and subsidised 
grants by the national government (Fig. 7).
Furthermore, the results presented in Fig. 8 demonstrate 
that 67% of the participants agreed that PPP models for water 
infrastructure are successful in funding and financing local 
government infrastructure. Their view is based on the munici-
pality conducting a proper feasibility assessment, ability to 
collect revenue, long-term revenue streams and affordabil-
ity, appropriate and transparent procurement processes and 
Figure 6
Percentage of respondents agreeing/disagreeing (arcsine √x 
transformed) on the use of PPP models to address operation and 
maintenance in the Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa
Figure 5
Percentage of respondents (arcsine √x transformed) agreeing/
disagreeing on the economic viability of existing PPP models in the 
Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces of South Africa
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for the provision of water services infrastructure assets to be 
accelerated around the country, implementation of any of PPP 
models will go a long way towards leveraging private sector 
investment in economic infrastructure assets and allowing the 
government to recycle its capital for socio-economic needs and 
development, while at the same time addressing demand risk.
The research results demonstrate that the ability of the 
municipalities to guarantee payment of services should be 
considered prior to finalising the PPP arrangements. Key vari-
ables that inform PPP financing arrangements are: (i) amount 
of debt required; (ii) ability to repay the debt; (iii) nature of the 
project(s); (iv) transfer of project risks such as design, construc-
tion and maintenance; (v) value for money; and (vi) financial 
and socio-political uniqueness of each municipality. Buy-in 
of key stakeholders such as consumers or local community is 
crucial and without their buy-in the project(s) will fail. Cost-
reflective tariffs are essential for the success of PPP models. 
National government contributions should be prioritised in 
municipalities where affordability is a challenge. Water services 
are highly politicised and this makes it difficult for municipali-
ties to promote cost-reflective tariffs required to ensure contin-
ued operation and maintenance of the infrastructure.
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APPENDIX 1
Questionnaire for the developing of a conceptual framework for public-private partnerships for local government 
water infrastructure.
SECTION A: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE NO.001
CONDUCT A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ALL THE PPP MODELS TO ESTABLISH SHORT-COMINGS, SUCCESSES, AND 
SUITABILITY TO CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTS.
A.  SUCCESS FACTORS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MODELS IN FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE:
A1.  Public-private partnership (PPP) models are successful in financing local government water infrastructure.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
A2.   PPP models are appropriate for financing local government water infrastructure.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
A3.  Government should promote the use of public-private partnership models in order to fast-track water services infrastructure delivery.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
A4.  Government should use public-private partnership models to address the problem of operation and maintenance of local 
government water infrastructure.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
B.  SHORT-COMINGS OF THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MODELS IN FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
B1.  In your view, what are the short-comings of the PPP models in financing local government water infrastructure?
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………
B2.  What are regulatory or legislative obstacles that can derail financing of local government water infrastructure through PPP 
models in South Africa?
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………




B4.  What are economic factors that can discourage use of PPP models in financing local government water infrastructure 
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C.  SUITABILITY OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MODELS FOR FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
C1.  Public-private partnership models are appropriate vehicles for financing water infrastructure during difficult economic 
conditions.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
C2.  Public-private partnership models are appropriate vehicles for addressing operation and maintenance of local government 
water infrastructure. 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
C3.  Public-private partnership models are appropriate vehicles for addressing institutional challenges required to ensure contin-
ued maintenance of local government water infrastructure.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
C4.  Public-private partnership models are socially acceptable models for financing local government water infrastructure in 
South Africa.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
SECTION B: RESEARCH OBJECTIVE NO.002
CONDUCT AN ASSESSMENT ON VARIOUS CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INSTI-
TUTIONS INVOLVED IN THE PPP MODELS.




D1.   Contractual arrangements for PPP models that I am aware of are yielding desired results or objectives.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐





D2-1  Contractual arrangements for PPP models in Limpopo and Gauteng Provinces are taking into account all key variables which 
can affect the effectiveness of PPP models? 
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
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SECTION C : RESEARCH OBJECTIVE NO.003
REVIEW FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS OR STRUCTURES THAT HAVE BEEN PUT IN PLACE TO GUIDE PPP MODELS IN 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT WATER INFRASTRUCTURE




E1.   Financing arrangements for PPP models that I am aware of are yielding desired results and objectives.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐





E2-1  Financing arrangements for PPP models in Limpopo and Gauteng Provinces are taking into account affordability and 
revenue flows which can affect the sustainability of PPP models.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
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E5.   Water sector PPP arrangements are attractive to investors and financiers.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
SECTION D : RESEARCH OBJECTIVE NO.004
DETERMINE KEY VARIABLES THAT SHOULD INFORM THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COST-EFFECTIVE PPP MODEL TO 
ENSURE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
F.  What are the primary variables that should inform the structure of the PPP models in the Gauteng and Limpopo Provinces?
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………
………………………………………………….........................................................................................................................………………………
F1.   The above-mentioned variables are taken into account in the current PPP models.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐




F2-1  The current PPP models that I am aware of are cost-effective and financially sustainable.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
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F3.  The existing PPP models are economically viable.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
F4.  The current PPP models that I am aware of are socially and politically acceptable.
Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐
